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INTRODUCTION
The divergence in the interest rates on sovereign bonds of eurozone countries
has drawn much attention in the course of the eurozone crisis. While Greece,
Portugal and Ireland lost market access early in the crisis and requested financial
support, other fiscally vulnerable countries periodically see their yields
approach levels deemed unsustainable. In particular, the evolution of Spain’s
and Italy’s borrowing costs repeatedly raises much concern as these countries
are generally considered ‘too big to rescue’. Hence, the fate of several countries
– and that of the euro – seems to hang on market views of their sustainability.
These obvious risks called for a more preemptive approach to the crisis manage-
ment. It was first recognized that the rescue funds, the temporary European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the permanent European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), should be able to act ‘ex-ante’ and not ‘only ex-post’ i.e. before and not only
after a country has effectively lost market access. Consequently, a eurozone country
can now in principle request precautionary financial support from the ESM in order
to prevent having to deal with refinancing difficulties in the future. Moreover, by
announcing ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT), the European Central Bank
(ECB) committed itself to granting unlimited support to countries having first
obtained the EFSF/ESM’s financial assistance. Finally, despite strong opposition by
some Member States, proposals for Eurobonds are being pushed forward, most
notably to reduce the spread of interest rates in the eurozone.
This paper focuses on the possible instruments for ‘ex-ante’/’preventive’/’pre-
cautionary’ interventions which can be deployed by the ESM and the ECB in
order to prevent a debt crisis in a eurozone country. The potential of Eurobonds
will also be discussed in this crisis management perspective.
The first part of this paper traces the underlying trends of the evolution of inter-
est rates in eurozone countries over the last decades. The second part discusses
the principles of a preventive intervention in sovereign bond markets for the
purpose of lowering borrowing costs of countries facing refinancing constraints;
the limits and main issues of an ex-ante intervention will be underlined. In the
third part, the properties of the ESM’s precautionary financial assistance and
secondary market support facility will be discussed in details. The ECB preemp-
tive intervention policies and, in particular, the OMT will be analyzed in the
fourth part of the paper. The most likely course of action – a combined interven-
tion by the ESM and the ECB – will be discussed in the fifth part. Finally, I will
point out the core challenges of introducing Eurobonds as additional instru-
ments to mitigate the rise of borrowing costs in the short term.
Xavier VANDEN BOSCH
Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Egmont7
1. EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS
IN THE EUROZONE: A BROAD DIAGNOSTIC
Following the Maastricht Treaty which set the course for the introduction of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), sovereign yields of future eurozone
members converged to reach low levels by the time the euro was introduced in
1999 (see figure 1). In retrospect, this convergence appears excessive. A first
possible explanation is that financial markets simply underestimated or failed to
acknowledge the risks of growing imbalances in several countries. Neither did
the market react to growing fiscal imbalances, nor to the deterioration of com-
petitiveness in several ‘peripheral’ countries (e.g. in Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Ireland). However, this might only seem obvious a posteriori: current
account deficits were justified in so far as the mirroring private capital flows
were believed to be financing productive investments rather than unsustainable
consumption and real-estate booms. More generally, conventional wisdom at
the time was that balance-of-payments were as irrelevant in the EMU as
between regions within a country1.
Figure 1: Evolution of 10 years government bonds’ yields in the eurozone (selected 
countries) (in %)
1.  Merler, S., Pisani-Ferry, J.,(2012), “Sudden stops in the euro area”, Bruegel policy contribution, Issue
2012/06, March 2012.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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A second possible source of explanation for the lack of market reaction to these
growing imbalances is that a genuine belief existed that a eurozone country
could not fail on its debt because of implicit guarantee mechanisms within the
currency area. In particular, the ‘no bail-out’ clause in the Treaty might not have
been perceived as fully credible2. Investors could also have believed that the ECB
would ultimately stand behind eurozone countries’ debt despite its statutory
prohibition to do so3. Financial markets regulation and ECB policies also tended
to consider all EU sovereign bonds as equally safe4.
Whatever the exact explanation for the market’s complacency in the last decade,
when the global economic and financial crisis hit the eurozone, excess of indebt-
edness and the unsustainable character of growth were revealed and accentu-
ated. In southern eurozone countries, external economic imbalances that had
built up since the introduction of the euro further accelerated due to ‘sudden
stops’ i.e. massive reversals of capital inflows5. Economic recession and in sev-
eral cases the rescue of the domestic financial sector led to an important deteri-
oration of public finances. Sizable deficits in turn further increased debt levels.
By the time the problems faced by Greece became obvious a major shift in the
eurozone sovereign bond market had taken place: government bonds’ yield
started to rise, incorporating the risk of default of countries which had by then
lost their safe status. This ultimately led Greece, Ireland and Portugal to require
a bail-out from their eurozone partners and the IMF.
At the time of writing, the market can infer from the lack of competitiveness and
structural problems of several vulnerable countries that they risk not being able
to adjust and redeem their debt denominated in euro, a de-facto foreign cur-
rency that is too expensive for their economy. Economically, socially and polit-
ically, the required internal devaluation and the burden of structural reforms
might be judged too harsh. If so, it can be anticipated that public debt will ulti-
mately be restructured: a loss imposed on private bond holders (via an ‘orderly
default’ similar to the one that took place for Greece). Alternatively, a ‘disor-
derly default’ could also occur if some countries left the euro, restored their
national currency and redeemed their debt now denominated in a devaluated
currency. Hence, the general assumption that eurozone countries could not
default was reversed and the irreversibility of the euro as a common currency is
now doubted by the market.
2.  Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereinafter TFEU.
3.  Article 123 TFEU.
4.  Financial regulation and ECB policies did not discriminate among government bonds: all were deemed
as equally ‘safe’. See Kopf, C., (2011), “Restoring financial stability in the euro area”, CEPS policy brief,
No 237, 15 March 2011.
5.  Op. cit. footnote 1.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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Consequently, interest rates on southern countries’ debt arguably not only
incorporate a classic ‘credit’ risk premium but also an ‘exchange rate’ risk pre-
mium (or ‘redenomination’/‘convertibility’ risk premium) reflecting the risk of a
break-up of the eurozone. In the short term, however, preventive interventions
in sovereign bond markets in order to mitigate the risk of a country losing access
to financial markets are conceivable. I will now turn to the principles of such
interventions.11
2. PRINCIPLES OF A PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION
IN SOVEREIGN BOND MARKETS
This chapter discusses the principles of a ‘preventive intervention’ i.e. ‘ex-ante’
financing mechanisms aimed at preventing a country from losing market access
and requesting an ‘ex-post’ bail-out. The discussion applies no matter which
entity actually intervenes (the ECB or the EFSF/ESM).
I will first present the main benefits that limiting the rise of interest rates on
sovereign bonds can deliver (2.1). I will then detail the mechanisms of an inter-
vention (2.2). Thirdly, I will describe the economic rationale underlying the
intervention: a complex mix of assumptions justifying the intervention (2.3).
Finally, the core issue associated with ex-ante assistance – that of balancing
moral hazard considerations and the stigma of assistance by setting the right
conditionality – will be discussed (2.4).
2.1. Main benefits
The primary objective of an intervention is to prevent a country from losing its
own access to financial markets i.e. prevent its borrowing cost from rising to
‘unsustainable’ levels at which point there is no longer a sufficient amount of
creditors willing to lend to the country. An interest rate level is deemed ‘unsus-
tainable’ or ‘unaffordable’ when it prevents a country from realistically stabiliz-
ing its debt level (see box 1). Given an initial debt level and growth perspectives,
the interest rate on the debt does mechanically determine the combined size of
budget cuts and extra revenues necessary to stabilize the debt level. As the inter-
est rate on the debt grows, so does the financing gap to stabilize the debt level.
Alternatively, if the interest rate decreases, so does the necessary adjustment
effort. Since the size of the possible adjustment is a matter of judgment, likewise
is the actual interest rate level deemed sustainable. In the current economic con-
text, Italy’s and Spain’s respective debts are generally believed to be unsustaina-
ble with an interest rate of around 7% for bonds issued with a maturity of 10
years6.
6.  However, it can be argued that debt would remain sustainable at those interest rate levels. See Cline,
W.R., (2012), “Sovereign Debt Sustainability in Italy and Spain: A Probabilistic Approach”, Working
Paper, WP 12-12, Peterson Institute of International Economics, August 2012.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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BOX 1: Fiscal sustainability as criteria for solvency78
When a country’s debt is growing without the perspective of stabilization, the
country is likely insolvent. Conversely, a country is likely to remain solvent if
it manages to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio7. An essential fiscal sustainabil-
ity indicator is the primary balance required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP
ratio (called the debt-stabilizing primary balance). The primary balance cor-
responds to the general government balance excluding interest payments on
government debt.
The following equation defines the debt-stabilizing primary balance 
(expressed as a percentage of GDP) necessary to maintain the debt-to-GDP
ratio  constant, where   is the real interest rate and   the real growth rate
of the economy8:
This can be simplified by neglecting the denominator on the right-hand side:
The adjustment effort to stabilize debt ratio, i.e. the ‘primary balance gap’,
reflects the necessary adjustment to stabilize debt, starting with an initial pri-
mary balance  :
The term   is called the ‘interest-growth differential’. When   there
is rising pressure on the debt-to-GDP ratio and vice versa when  . This
means that as borrowing costs rise so does the size of the adjustment effort.
When r is very high, in particular given modest growth perspectives, the
adjustment effort might become too large to be sustainable.
For example, a country with an initial primary fiscal deficit   of (-) 2%, debt-
to-DGP ratio of 80%, a growth rate of 1% and interest rate of 4%, must fill
a primary balance gap of 2.4% of GDP:
7.  Blanchard, O., (1990), “Suggestions for a new set of fiscal indicators”, OECD working papers, N° 79.
8.  Escolano, J., (2010), “A practical guide to public debt dynamics, fiscal sustainability, and cyclical
adjustment of budgetary aggregates”, Technical notes and manuals, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF, Jan-
uary 2010.
p*
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As long as borrowing costs remain at an affordable level, the country is able to
refinance itself and can pursue its adjustment effort to stabilize and bring down
its debt level. Intervening to allow a country to preserve its market access
presents several advantages.
From the perspective of creditor countries, providing limited ex-ante financing
might be preferable because it would be more efficient and less costly than an
ex-post bail-out. By definition, if the intervention is efficient the country will at
least partially continue to finance itself from private investors rather than from
official public lenders in the event it loses access to financial markets. Ensuring
that private creditors continue to invest in a distressed country’s bonds is partic-
ularly recommendable because of the relatively limited availability of funding
for an ex-post rescue. For example, a combined bail-out of Spain and Italy
would be difficult to handle given the size of current financial backstops, in
particular the size of the ESM9. Furthermore, increasing the backstops’ capacity
is politically challenging, notably in creditor countries such as Germany, the
Netherlands and Finland, which are concerned about the risks involved.
From the perspective of beneficiary countries, the ex-ante financial assistance
first and foremost lowers the risk of a default and the significant economic costs
attached to it. It can also reduce the political stigma of the external support by
allowing the beneficiary country to retain more independence while pursuing its
adjustment. This would in turn foster social and political stability in countries
where sizable efforts are required to restore their economic and fiscal sustaina-
bility. This is a crucial and somewhat overlooked factor in the longer-term crisis
management perspective.
2.2. Intervention mechanisms: primary and secondary 
market purchases
An intervention can consist in purchasing sovereign bonds on the primary mar-
ket, i.e. at issuance, or on the secondary market where bonds are traded. The
announcement of a bond-buying program which precedes its actual or potential
activation is also particularly relevant. As it influences interest rates in the mar-
ket by shaping expectations, the commitment to intervene in the future must be
considered as a crucial and integral part of the intervention mechanism.
Intervening in the primary market, by participating in auctions or syndicated
transactions, amounts to directly financing a country’s debt. The direct recipient
of the transaction is the issuing country. In principle, only the EFSF and ESM
9.  This argument will be further explored in section 3.1.C which discusses the lending capacity of the
ESM.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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can do so for eurozone countries as the Treaty forbids the ECB from financing
countries directly10. The EFSF or ESM intervention first and foremost reduces
the risk of the beneficiary country experiencing a failed auction or not raising
the required funding amount. By ensuring enough demand, the intervention also
seeks to lower the interest rate at issuance (i.e. raise the bond price). The pres-
ence of the EFSF or ESM in the transaction would also limit the risk of exces-
sively high interest rates (‘out of the market’ prices) being posted by opportun-
istic primary dealers to test the needs of the country11. More generally, primary
market purchases also contribute to the overall liquidity in the secondary mar-
ket.
A secondary market intervention consists in the purchase of sovereign bonds
from private investors in the market. A secondary market intervention first and
foremost ensures liquidity in debt markets. It influences the price not only in the
secondary market but also in the primary market, since both are closely linked.
It thus encourages private investors to further participate in the financing of the
country. Moreover, although the direct recipient of the transaction is a private
selling entity, such as bank or a fund, the issuing country indirectly benefits from
the transaction, as some of its debt is ultimately held by the intervener (the ECB
or the EFSF/ESM).
Even before any transaction takes place, the stated commitment of the ECB or
the EFSF/ESM to intervene can contribute to ensuring favorable trading condi-
tions by shaping market participants’ expectations. Such an announcement pro-
duces what is referred to as the ‘deterrent effect’. In principle, the deterrent effect
is maximized if the commitment to intervene is credibly unlimited and uncondi-
tional. It would amount to giving full assurance to investors that a country will
not be allowed to default under any circumstances. The consequence would be
that interest rates would be kept to a minimum as considerations regarding sol-
vency will be dominated by the presence of a ‘lender of last resort’ who commits
to buy sovereign bonds if the country is unable to finance itself. In practice, a
genuine lender of last resort can only be credibly endorsed by the central bank
because of its ability to create money12.
Otherwise, as a principle, if the guarantee provided by a fund or the ECB is
perceived by the market as not absolute, interest rates will still reflect the possi-
bility of a default. Thus if only limited funds are committed or conditionality is
imposed, the initial positive effect of the announcement to intervene can possi-
bly wane over time if other factors gradually undermine investors’ confidence.
10.  Article 123 TFEU.
11.  EFSF, (2011), EFSF Guideline on Primary Market Purchases, November 29, 2011.
12.  For a discussion about the role of the ECB see Buiter, W.H., Rahbari, E., (2012), “The ECB as lender
of last resort for sovereigns in the euro area”, Discussion paper, Center for Economic Policy Research,
N°8974, May 2012.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
15
2.3. Economic rationale: what justifies intervening in 
sovereign bond markets?
An intervention is essentially justified to the extent that a country suffers from
self-fulfilling expectations of insolvency, in particular when these are linked to
the break-up of the eurozone. Doubts about the solvency of a country which
might actually be solvent can lead to its actual insolvency because debt holders
fear such an event. If such is the case, markets could arguably be considered as
‘dysfunctional’ because they would overprice the risk of default above that
which a country’s ‘fundamentals’ would suggest.
This self-fulfilling dynamic of insolvency can originate from a combination of
different uncertainties. The first is that a country’s risk of default is intrinsically
difficult to estimate (A). When a country starts experiencing liquidity con-
straints, it is difficult to distinguish between genuine solvency issues and mere
liquidity constraints. The second is that the dominant expectation that the coun-
try will lack the necessary funding and ultimately default can lead to a self-
fulfilling crisis where all investors race to sell (B). Moreover, this risk is particu-
larly acute in an incomplete currency union such as the EMU (C). Finally, the
critique of this rationale will be considered and some conclusions drawn (D).
A. The uncertainty about the solvency of a country
The solvency of a country is inherently difficult to assess because sovereign debt
servicing is ultimately determined by the country’s willingness, rather than
capacity, to pay13. No straightforward legal mechanism exists to enforce repay-
ment of a sovereign debt. Moreover, creditors cannot easily coordinate to
enforce repayment. In principle, a country might always choose to repudiate its
debt, either for internal political reasons or following a rational estimation that
the cost of default is smaller than the cost of continuing to service the debt14.
Moreover, a country’s repayment capacity depends on an inherently intangible
and illiquid asset: its capacity to generate future tax revenues. The economic
worth of this asset is difficult to valuate as it depends on the capacity and will-
ingness of the country’s taxpayers to allow debt servicing and of its administra-
tive capacity to raise revenue. In theory, a country could run deficits as long as
what it borrows is invested in a productive capacity that will generate more tax
revenues in the future which will be used to redeem the generated debt. This
‘inter-temporal budget constraint’ is, however, too loose to be of any practical
13.  See for a discussion: Lucke, B., Wurzel, B., (2011), “Debt sustainability, illiquidity and insolvency”,
September 2011.
14.  Krugmann, P., (1988), “Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang”, Journal of Development Econom-
ics 29, 253-268.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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use15. Even if this path was assumed to be credible future taxation increases or
cuts in spending would prove damaging for growth, negatively impacting future
generations. In practice, much more practical criteria are used as indicators of
solvency, such as debt sustainability criteria16.
Hence, because a country might always choose to repudiate its debt and because
solvency cannot be determined but only approximated, a country’s solvency is
inherently uncertain. This uncertainty can in turn feed a self-fulfilling dynamic
of insolvency to which I now turn.
B. The dynamic of self-fulfilling fears of insolvency
Because the solvency of a country is inherently uncertain, a shift of perception
in the market can lead to a drying out of liquidities. Market participants cannot
coordinate. Consequently, when market sentiment deteriorates, an investor
essentially needs to guess how the market i.e. all other investors will behave,
rather than assess on his own whether a country’s debt is sustainable or not.
When a country starts experiencing refinancing constraints, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between a genuine solvency problem and a mere liquidity problem. A
legitimate anticipation is that uncertainty and widespread lack of confidence
will lead many investors to sell, thereby driving bond prices down and interest
rates up. Consequently, the rise of borrowing costs will widen the financing gap
and make the stabilization of debt all the more difficult17. As a result, a rational
investor would also decide to sell.
Following this logic, all investors will predict the insolvency of a distressed
country and anticipate a default. There is a ‘race to sell’ in order to avoid antic-
ipated losses that would result from a default. Any event perceived as a signal
for a future default can further fuel this dynamic. Ultimately, this self-fulfilling
effect can effectively push the country out of financial markets. A liquidity crisis
can thus easily degenerate into a solvency crisis, just like a shift in sentiment can
lead to a bank run. Namely, a bank might be solvent but experience a liquidity
crisis that degenerates into a default when the fears of depositors ultimately lead
to the bank’s bankruptcy, as they rush to withdraw their money. An illiquid but
solvent country can similarly experience self-fulfilling crises.
The theory of self-fulfilling fears of insolvency essentially means that uncertainty
generates uncertainty. If this effect dominates, the pricing of sovereign debt can-
not simply be explained by indicators of the country’s solvency ‘fundamentals’.
Once the market i.e. the aggregation of individual market participants starts to
15.  Roubini, N., (2001), “Debt sustainability: how to assess whether a country is insolvent?”, Stern
School of Business, NYU, available at: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/debtsustainability.pdf.
16.  See Box 1 in section 2.1.
17.  Ibidem.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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consider the possibility of a country defaulting on its debt, then a change in
‘market sentiment’ can much better explain market prices. This theory implies
that once a self-fulfilling dynamic is at play due to a loss of confidence, some
‘mispricing’ by the market beyond more observable characteristics is inevitable.
Market failure can thus occur as markets are not perfectly efficient.
C. Added uncertainty stemming from the ‘incomplete’ EMU
The risk of swing in market sentiment is arguably particularly acute in a cur-
rency union such as the EMU18. Firstly, EMU Members have abandoned their
control over the currency in which their debt is denominated. They have also
relinquished control over their central bank and cannot benefit from the liquid-
ities it could provide in case of a liquidity crisis. There is no lender of last resort
in the EMU that could prevent a panic.
Secondly, in a currency union such as the EMU, exchange rates between mem-
bers are fixed. In a flexible exchange rate mechanism, a loss of confidence in one
country would automatically result in the depreciation of its currency. This
depreciation would in turn contribute to making the country more competitive
and to restoring confidence. However, an EMU member can only recourse to
‘internal devaluation’ where it seeks to regain competitiveness by lowering wage
costs and increasing productivity (as opposed to an ‘external devaluation
whereby it reduces the exchange rate value). As this process is socially and polit-
ically challenging, it raises some doubt with regard to whether it can be sus-
tained over time. Moreover, in the absence of a foreign exchange market and a
flexible currency, a country in such a process must face the additional problem
that available liquidities in the country as a whole will shrink as capital flies to
other countries of the currency union considered safer.
Finally, there is no fiscal union backing the currency union in the EMU. In par-
ticular, no transfer mechanism within the union can act as a buffer from heter-
ogeneous shocks among its members19. In what is essentially a heterogeneous
currency area, no central budget exists that could transfer resources to members
to facilitate the adjustment to such temporary shocks.
As a result, once the mood in the market becomes pessimistic, the adjustment
difficulties for an EMU member are bound to be larger than had the country not
been part of the EMU. The self-fulfilling run on the country is not mitigated by
the country’s central bank acting as a lender of last resort; its exchange rate
cannot devalue to restore part of its competitiveness and capital will leave the
18.  De Grauwe, P., (2011), “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, Economic Policy, CEPS Working
Documents, May 2011.
19.  Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group, (2012), “Completing the Euro: a road map towards fiscal union
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country. These make the efforts to rebalance public finance and restore the
country’s competitiveness all the more challenging. In the absence of other forms
of solidarity mechanisms, affected countries must essentially restore the situa-
tion on their own. Ex-ante intervention can hence be justified on this ground as
well.
D. Critique of rationale and conclusion
The rationale discussed in the previous sections justifies providing liquidities to
a country in order to prevent a crisis, can of course be critiqued.
In a nutshell, for opponents of preventive interventions, sovereign bond markets
would not be ‘dysfunctional’ nor would the increase of interest rate reflect
‘unfounded fears’ or be ‘irrational’. There would be no such thing as a liquidity
crisis potentially developing into a solvency crisis because of self-fulfilling
dynamics. If the market is not willing to provide the requested funding to a
country, it is right to do so, estimating the country is nearing insolvency. It
would hence be inefficient to try influencing the interest rates contrary to what
the market is freely and effectively determining.
Perfect market efficiency is an extreme assumption but it is sensible to acknowl-
edge that the market delivers important signals regarding solvency fundamen-
tals. In this sense, it is pertinent to recognize that the rise in borrowing cost
essentially results from major insolvency problems due to the large economic
imbalances that built up in the decade following the introduction of the euro.
There is no such thing as a pure liquidity crisis: liquidity problems necessarily
arise jointly with solvency problems.
On the other hand, it is fair to recognize that self-fulfilling dynamics may play
a significant role. Prevailing market rates might incorporate a risk premium
associated with the perceived ‘reversibility’ of the euro. This risk in turns
increases in particular because of the characteristics of the EMU, which lacks
both a lender of last resort and a fiscal union. If the eurozone was ‘complete’,
investors would not go so far as to price the risk of the country leaving the
eurozone i.e. a break-up of the eurozone.
Testing for the degree of market efficiency is difficult is as difficult as testing for
the degree of its inefficiency20. Consequently, high unsustainable yields on sov-
ereign bonds can either be considered as a rather ‘rational’ view regarding the
risk of default given the fundamentals or alternatively as an ‘unjustified’ and
20.  For an attempt see De Grauwe, P., Ji,Y., (2012), “Self-fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: an empirical
test”, CEPS working document, N°366, June 2012.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
19
‘irrational’ view of the market beyond what fundamentals would suggest (or
even consist in a ‘speculative attack’).
An intermediary view – assuming markets are mostly efficient but can nonethe-
less be prone to self-fulfilling runs – might be the most sensible approach21.
Following this logic, an intervention to limit the fear of a eurozone break up can
be justified, but is, however, inherently limited and partly political. It is inher-
ently limited because it should not be assumed that ‘unjustified’, ‘unfounded’,
‘irrational’ self-fulfilling dynamics are overly dominating some ‘justified’,
‘rational’ views of the market. It is partly political because in so far as fears of
insolvency amount to a fear of break-up of the eurozone, an intervention to
‘remove’ those ‘unfounded’ fears cannot be justified on pure technical economic
grounds.
Conclusion: interventions can only buy time for political action
The key conclusion is that interventions can only buy time for political action.
First of all, the success of the intervention mostly depends on market forces.
Investors need to maintain sufficient trust in the beneficiary country to keep
financing it. This will depend on many variables and most notably on its growth
perspectives. Bond purchases can only partially contribute to building confi-
dence that the beneficiary country will turn out to be solvent, and that the euro
is an irreversible common currency. Hence, the time or ‘breathing space’ bought
by the intervention must necessarily be completed by political action to allow
for a complete restoration of confidence in the long term solvency of the bene-
ficiary country. First, fiscal and structural measures to revert the fundamental
economic imbalances that built up in beneficiary countries must be adopted.
Secondly, in so far as high borrowing costs reflect the risks linked to an ‘incom-
plete’ EMU, the economic pillar of the EMU should be strengthened in time.
2.4. Problems and concerns: moral hazard and stigma 
of assistance
A trade-off exists between preventing moral hazard risks and ensuring the effec-
tiveness of the intervention. This must be considered when setting the conditions
a country must fulfill in order to benefit from the pre-emptive financial assist-
ance.
In practice, by lowering borrowing costs or preventing their rise, sovereign debt
purchases remove some of the market pressure that would otherwise be exerted
21.  This seems to be the approach endorsed by the ECB. See section 4.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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on the country. Interventions also facilitate access to financing. Moral hazard
arises in so far as the intervention negatively affects the country’s effort to pur-
sue its adjustment because the threat of losing market access decreases. Moral
hazard is, however, inherent to any guaranteeing mechanism. The risk of moral
hazard can be mitigated by imposing conditions on the country benefiting from
the intervention.
Having few or no conditions improve the deterrent effect (or ‘lender of last
resort’ effect) as the market can be confident that the country will not be barred
from benefiting from market purchases (and the associated liquidity provisions).
Moreover, it makes it politically easier for the country to request support –
hence the ‘political stigma’ of the financial support decreases. However, when
conditions are lax, there could be a moral hazard issue stemming from the inter-
vention. In the extreme case – having unconditional access to liquidities – the
country might not make the necessary effort to restore more sustainable financ-
ing conditions.
On the other hand, strict conditions make the activation of the measures more
uncertain. While moral hazard considerations would be alleviated, much stigma
will be associated with the use of the liquidity facility. Both for creditors’ con-
siderations (an ‘economic stigma’) and for domestic political considerations (a
‘political stigma’), the ailing country might refrain from using the facility, as it
would not want to be perceived as a country in difficulty. Since the solvency of
a country cannot be exactly determined by the market, the mere granting of any
support – even allegedly ‘preventive’ – would signal either a liquidity issue or
possibly a solvency issue. Strong conditions could reinforce the impression that
the country is not merely illiquid – which would justify some liquidity assistance
– but is actually insolvent. Also, a government would not want to be perceived
as a ‘programme country’ upon which reforms and austerity are enforced, as
this might incur political cost as well. This stigma can be compared to the appar-
ent stigma attached to the IMF precautionary assistance (which has been so far
only requested by a few countries)22.
22.  At the time of writing, only Mexico, Colombia and Poland dispose of a flexible credit line. Only
Macedonia disposes of a Precautionary and Liquidity Line which is the equivalent of an ESM Enhanced
Conditions Credit Line (see infra). For a review of the IMF’s prevention tools, see Marino, R., Volz, U.,
(2012), “A critical review of the IMF’s Tools for crisis prevention”, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungs-
politik, Discussion paper, 4/2012. 21
3. PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION OF THE ESM 
IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MARKETS
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) constitute the main financial backstops for eurozone coun-
tries facing refinancing difficulties. These ‘rescue’ funds come into question
when a country’s access to financial markets is lost (‘ex-post’); but they can also
act to prevent such an event (‘ex-ante’), notably by intervening in primary and
secondary markets. This chapter focuses on this latter possibility, with a partic-
ular emphasis on the ESM, as ultimately, it will permanently replace the EFSF.
Firstly, the functioning principles and underlying characteristics of the ESM will
be addressed (3.1). I will then turn to the precise forms the preventive interven-
tions can take (3.2).
3.1. Main characteristics and functioning of the ESM
I will first give an overview of the functioning of the ESM (A). The most impor-
tant characteristic of the ESM, its guarantee structure, will then be analyzed (B).
This feature fundamentally determines the fund intervention capacity to which
I will then turn (C).
A. Functioning principles
Figure 2 (p. 22) schematically represents the key functioning steps of the ESM.
Firstly, eurozone countries pool their guarantees in the ESM (step 1 – In what
this guarantee consists will be further developed infra). In turn the ESM borrows
by issuing bonds (the ‘common issuance’) on the market (2). Thirdly, the ESM
lends the proceeds back to a recipient country (the ‘beneficiary countries’) (3).
When lending, a small margin can possibly be levied above the borrowing cost
so that the funds make some profit, which will be fed into a reserve fund acting
as additional collateral. Fourthly, the ESM services the debt it owes to the inves-
tors in the common issuance (4). Finally, beneficiary countries reimburse the
ESM (5).
By pooling their guarantees, eurozone members actually borrow collectively
through the fund by issuing common debt. The ESM acts as a leveraged vehicle
whose purpose is to enhance the borrowing capacity of its members, specifically
by offering a lower interest rate than the one the beneficiary country would have
to pay through its own national issuance. Instead of issuing its own national
bond, the beneficiary country can in practice borrow at a lower cost from the
market via the ESM.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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B. Guarantee structure
The guarantee structure constitutes the backbone of the ESM capacity to bor-
row in financial markets and to lend to countries that request financial sup-
port23. This structure essentially decides the ESM credit quality by determining
how the fund’s creditors are protected from a beneficiary country’s default.
The ESM, as a permanent mechanism, unlike the EFSF, benefits from its own
paid-in capital which will initially amount to EUR 80bn out of a total author-
ized capital of EUR 700bn24. In principle, this makes it less reliant on the credit
Figure 2: ESM scheme overview
23.  I refer to the ‘guarantee structure’ rather than the ‘capital structure’ of the ESM in order to underline
that the ESM globally relies on its members’ commitment to back the structure if necessary.
24.  EU Council, (2012), Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, hereinafter ‘ESM
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quality of its members acting as shareholders/guarantors. The contribution key
of ESM members to the capital of the ESM corresponds to their respective share
in the ECB25. The payment of paid-in shares must ensure that a minimum ratio
of 15% is maintained between the paid-in capital and the outstanding amount
of ESM issuances i.e. the amount borrowed by the ESM26.
The ESM guarantee structure is composed of three layers. In case of default of
a beneficiary country27, the resulting losses will first be covered by the reserve
fund which essentially consists of the accumulated net income from its opera-
tions28, then by the paid-in capital (initially EUR 80bn) and lastly – in order to
restore the level of paid-in capital – by calling in authorized unpaid capital (ini-
tially amounting to EUR 620bn) by a simple majority of the Board of Direc-
tors29. This means that the ESM equity (the paid-in capital and the potentially
callable capital) and to a lesser extent its accumulated reserves function as a
capital buffer that can absorb losses.
Moreover, another important disposition is that ESM loans enjoy a ‘seniority
status’ (or ‘preferred creditor status’) over any other private creditors and will
be junior only to IMF claims30. Inspired by a similar implicit disposition of the
IMF, the preferred creditor status intends to protect the ESM (and its private
creditors) from a debt restructuring in a beneficiary country. It implies that if a
beneficiary country defaults, the losses will first have to be borne by private
bond holders and only next by the ESM followed by the IMF. This disposition
should, however, not apply to instruments other than loans, in particular to
primary or secondary market purchases31.
25.  Temporarily adjusted to reflect the difference in GDP per capita among the ESM members. See Art.
42 of ESM Treaty, ibid.
26.  Art. 41(2) ESM Treaty, ibid.
27.  Art. 25 ESM Treaty, ibid.
28.  Art. 24 ESM Treaty, ibid. and ESM, (2012), ESM Pricing policy. The ESM’s levied margin will range
between 10 and 35 basis points depending on instruments. The reserve fund will also include sanctions
under the excessive deficit procedure and macro-economic imbalances procedure. The ESM might also
make capital gains following its bond purchases on primary or secondary markets.
29.  Art. 9(2) ESM Treaty, op. cit. footnote 24. It is very unlikely that a simple majority decision calling
for the payment of some of the remaining callable capital would not be found. Countries already commit-
ted themselves to provide their contribution up to a maximum liability corresponding to their share of the
total authorized stock. Nonetheless, if they were unable to do so they would lose their voting rights (Art.
4 (8) of ibid.). Moreover, in case of emergency, to avoid a payment default the Managing Director of the
ESM can even make capital call to ESM shareholders without the prior consent of the Board of Directors
(Art 9 (3) of ibid.). 
30.  Whereas 13, preamble of ESM Treaty, op. cit. footnote 24.
31.  This is, however, not clear-cut and might create a contention. The first version of the ESM Treaty
mentioned that the ESM – as a whole – would enjoy a preferred creditor status. The final version refers
only to ‘ESM loans’. Hence, in principle only ESM loans under a macroeconomic adjustment programme
and recapitalization facilities will enjoy seniority status, as communicated by the ESM. See ESM, (2012),
Frequently Asked Questions on the ESM. PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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C. Capacity
The maximum lending capacity of the ESM is fixed at EUR 500bn32. This
amount is far too limited to fully bail out large and highly indebted economies
like Spain and Italy33. This ceiling can, however, be revised at any time by a
unanimous decision of the Board of Governors (i.e. eurozone finance minis-
ters): extra capital can be called in out of the total authorized capital which
itself can be revised34. Respecting the 15% leverage ratio35, for every euro of
paid-in capital, a maximum of EUR 6.6 could be raised in financial markets.
However, an increase of the ESM ‘fire-power’ faces political and economic con-
straints.
In principle, when calling for additional capital, finance ministers would also
need to unanimously agree whether the total authorized capital remains ade-
quate36. The link between the total authorized capital (EUR 700bn) and the
total lending capacity (EUR 500bn) is, however, not fixed in the ESM Treaty. As
it stands, the authorized capital exceeds the lending capacity by 40%. Raising
the authorized capital stock in proportion to the increase of the lending capacity
would ensure that the ESM maintains an optimal credit quality, allowing it to
borrow at relatively low rates.
However, raising the authorized capital stock is a major political issue as it raises
the potential liabilities (i.e. contingent liabilities) of ESM members. This prob-
lem was highlighted by the German Federal Constitutional Court’s September
2012 preliminary ruling over the ESM37. It stated that the German commitment
could not go beyond Germany’s share of the authorized capital stock (EUR
190bn) without consent from Parliament. Nevertheless, beyond clear political
issues, the economic constraint on ESM members is relative. The ESM author-
ized capital represents 5% of the eurozone GDP, less than the total aid granted
to the financial sector in the eurozone between 2008 and 2010 (9.1% of euro-
zone GDP)38.
In order to circumvent the political issue of increasing the ESM capital, the ESM
capacity could also be leveraged – basically allowing it to do more with its cur-
32.  Art. 39 ESM Treaty op. cit. footnote 24. This amount more precisely corresponds to the combined
fresh lending capacity of the ESM and the EFSF as up to July 2013 the EFSF may still engage in new pro-
grammes (only) if necessary to ensure a full fresh lending capacity of EUR 500bn. However, the EUR
500bn lending capacity could also be reached within this period through accelerated capital payments of
the ESM.
33.  See infra, section 3.2.D for a discussion on these countries’ refinancing needs.
34.  Art 5, Art 9 and Art 10 ESM Treaty, op. cit, footnote 24.
35.  Op. cit. footnote 26.
36.  Art 10 ESM Treaty, op. cit, footnote 24.
37.  See German Federal Constitutional Court, (2012), extract of decision of September 12, 2012, availa-
ble at: http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html. 
38.  Own calculation based on EU Commission, (2011), “Autumn 2011 update of the State aid score-
board”, COM(2011)848, 01.12.2011 and EU Commission, (2011), Facts and figures on state aid in the
EU Member States, Commission Staff working document, SEC(2011)1487, 01.12.2011.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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rent capacity. Two options can be considered but remain very uncertain39. The
first consists in selling to private investors of insurance partially covering poten-
tial losses on a bond bought at a primary auction. The second consists in the
establishment by the ESM of co-investment funds for private sector investors
with the ESM providing first tranche loss absorption. However, neither option,
both of which were initially considered as a leverage options for the EFSF
seemed to attract investors’ interest. Moreover, both mechanisms arguably con-
tradict the seniority clause of the ESM: in case of default, the ESM would first
have to compensate private investors for their loss40.
In any case, from an economic perspective, financial engineering necessarily has
limits. Raising the ESM lending capacity would eventually reach a ceiling
because the ESM is limited by the quality of the underlying guarantees provided
by the guarantors – eurozone countries – which is determined by their credit
quality. The ESM cannot be indefinitely leveraged or indefinitely call capital to
be transferred by its members, without either jeopardizing its own sustainability
or that of its members. A more absolute approach would be for the ECB to back
the ESM, for example by granting it a banking license or to back it in any other
way, but this option meets strong opposition including that of the ECB41.
Due to these constraints on increasing the capacity of the ESM, a preventive
programme maximizing the ESM’s intervention capacity is clearly the most
readily available solution to deal with eurozone countries’ debt issues.
3.2. Precautionary financial assistance and secondary 
market interventions
The possible financial assistance instruments will first be explained (A). I will
then discuss in more detail the conditionality of the intervention (B), the grant-
ing procedure (C), the capacity of the intervention (D) and, finally, the monitor-
ing involved (E).
A. Instruments
The EFSF and ESM were initially designed to function strictly on an ex-post
basis. The funds were meant as ‘rescue funds’ that would intervene as a last
resort when a country would effectively have no other option than to request
their assistance. However, at the Euro Area Summit on 21 July 2011, European
39.  These options were initially considered for the EFSF. See EU Council, (2011), Euro Summit State-
ment, 26 October 2011.
40.  Art 13 ESM Treaty, op. cit, footnote 24. 
41.  Moreover, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court, the backing of the ESM would
require a Treaty change. See op. cit. footnote 37. PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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leaders agreed to ‘increase the flexibility [of the EFSF and ESM] linked to appro-
priate conditionality’42. In particular, concerning the flexible funding of coun-
tries, the funds were allowed to:
(I) Act on the basis of a precautionary programme;
On the basis of such a ‘precautionary programme’, the ESM can provide precau-
tionary financial assistance (PFA), which takes the form of credit lines. Similarly
to the IMF crisis prevention facilities (i.e. the Flexible Credit Line and the Pre-
cautionary and Liquidity Line)43, the ESM disposes of two types of credit lines,
which essentially differ in their conditionality: a Precautionary conditioned
credit line (PCCL) and an Enhanced conditions credit line (ECCL). Once
granted a credit line, a beneficiary country can in turn request the draw-down
of funds as a loan or a primary market intervention (via a Primary Market Sup-
port Facility (PMSF)). This can be done under the agreed terms at any time
during the availability of the credit line.
(ii) Intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recog-
nizing the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to
financial stability and on the basis of a decision by mutual agreement of the
EFSF/ESM Member States, to avoid contagion.
Thus the ESM can also intervene in secondary markets after a Secondary Mar-
ket Support Facility (SMSF) is granted to a eurozone country. This is done on
the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing an exceptional market situation that
could threaten the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Mem-
ber States44.
B. Conditionality
Some general conditions apply to all instruments of ESM preventive assistance.
As of 1 March 2013, assistance will be conditional on the ratification of the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (TSCG) (aka the ‘Fiscal compact’)45. The general principle set in the
ESM Treaty is that the minimum conditions correspond to a ‘continuous respect
of pre-established eligibility conditions’46. The general conditionality principle
42.  EU Council, (2011), Council of the European Union, “Statement by the Heads of State or Govern-
ment of the Euro Area and EU Institutions”, 21 July 2011.
43.  See IMF, (2012), The IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line, IMF Factsheet, available at: http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/pll.pdf.
44.  ESM, (2012), ESM Guideline on the Secondary Market Support Facility.
45.  As of October 2012, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain
have ratified the ‘Fiscal compact’. When the Treaty enters into force, its signatories will have a year to
transpose its requirements in the national law. See whereas 5, preamble of ESM Treaty, op. cit. footnote
24.
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reconciles “strict conditionality” – which was notably a pre-condition to create
the funds47 – with the “flexibility” required by pre-emptive financial assistance.
The result is a ‘strict but appropriate conditionality’48. Any intervention requires
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) along with a Financial
Assistance Facility Agreement (FFA). The former specifies the conditionality,
notably the reforms to be undertaken in the recipient countries, and the latter
specifies the financial terms of the support in compliance with the policy condi-
tions.
The specific conditions for primary market intervention or the drawing of loans
under a precautionary programme are specified in the conditions for obtaining
a credit line49. In principle the beneficiary of a credit line must always exhibit a
sound general economic and financial situation i.e. the beneficiary must in prin-
ciple always remain solvent. When granting a credit line, ex-ante conditionality
is favored but if some of these ex-ante conditions are not met, some ex-post
conditions are added. The ESM therefore disposes of two types of credit lines:
the ‘Precautionary conditioned credit line’ (PCCL), where all eligibility criteria
are met; and the ‘Enhanced conditions credit line’ (ECCL) where some eligibility
criteria are not met and must therefore be compensated for by adopting correc-
tive measures to address the vulnerabilities identified.
The ESM guidelines mention the following eligibility criteria50:
(i) The respect of Stability and Growth Pact commitments (although countries
under excessive deficit procedure (EDP) could still access PCCL if they
fully abide by the Council decisions and recommendations in the proce-
dure);
(ii) A sustainable public debt;
(iii) The respect of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) (although coun-
tries under excessive imbalance procedure could still access PCCL if they
fully abide by the Council decisions and recommendations in the proce-
dure);
(iv) A track record of access to international capital markets on reasonable
terms;
(v) A sustainable external position;
(vi) The absence of bank solvency problems that can pose systemic threats to
the eurozone banking system. (Eurozone members under an excessive
47.  As in the article 136 TFEU, as amended by EU Council decision 2011/199/EU.
48.  As mentioned in EFSF, (2011), EFSF Guidelines on precautionary programmes.
49.  See Annex 1 for a full overview of conditions under a primary market intervention and a secondary
market intervention.
50.  See ESM, (2012), ESM Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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imbalance procedure could still access a PCCL subject to demonstrating a
formal commitment to address the imbalances identified by the European
Council).
Concerning secondary market purchases, a country outside a macro-economic
adjustment programme would in principle need to comply with the same ex-
ante eligibility criteria. But contrary to primary market purchases under an
ECCL, countries do not have the possibility of compensating unmet criteria by
committing themselves to ‘enhanced’ conditions. The country would moreover
need to be subject to financial markets disruptions, as assessed by the ECB.
C. Procedure
The procedure for granting a Secondary Market Support Facility (SMSF)51 and
a Precautionary Financial Assistance (PFA52) – the latter in turn allowing for a
Primary Market Support Facility (PMSF) – are essentially the same.
The first step in the granting procedure is that the ESM member requests a
SMSF/PFA to the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors i.e. the president
of the Eurogroup.
Secondly, the Commission in liaison with the ECB is entrusted with key tasks
that will determine the eligibility of the requesting country and conditions
attached to the financial support. The Commission and the ECB will need:
(a) to assess the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as
a whole or of its Member States; for a SMSF, the ECB will also assess
whether there are exceptional market circumstances;
(b) to assess whether general government debt is sustainable. For a PFA, wher-
ever appropriate and possible, such an assessment will be conducted
together with the IMF;
(c) to assess the actual or potential financing needs of the eurozone country
concerned;
(d) (for a PFA): to assess whether the eurozone country concerned meets the
conditions for accessing a PCCL or an ECCL.
Thirdly, on the basis of the Commission’s assessment, the Managing Director of
the ESM will prepare a proposal for financial assistance on the basis of which
the Board of Governors may decide to grant SMSF/PFA.
51.  See ESM, (2012), ESM Guideline on the Secondary Market Support Facility.
52.  See ESM, (2012), ESM Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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Fourthly, the Commission in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible,
together with the IMF, will negotiate with the Member State concerned a MoU
detailing the policy conditions attached to the precautionary programme. In
parallel, a financial assistance facility agreement (FFA), detailing the financial
terms and conditions of the precautionary financial assistance is prepared by the
Managing Director of the ESM.
Finally, the Commission signs on behalf of the ESM the MoU subject to the
approval of the Board of Governors, and the Managing Director of the ESM
signs the FFA.
At this stage, when granted PFA, the requesting country disposes of a credit line
which can be used afterwards. The activation – i.e. the draw-down of funds –
can be made upon request by the beneficiary country during the availability
period of the credit line according to the agreed terms. In principle, this can
either take the form of a loan or a primary market purchase. When granted a
SMSF, the actual activation rests solely in the hands of the ESM. Its deactivation
can however be requested by the beneficiary country53.
D. Intervention capacity
The size of the intervention is first of all constrained by the ESM overall lending
capacity discussed previously54. However, what matters most directly is the size
of the ‘envelope’ of funds earmarked to purchases bonds in primary or second-
ary markets.
Concerning primary market purchases, this envelope corresponds to the amount
of the credit line granted to the beneficiary country. A credit line is available for
one year, renewable twice, for six months each time55. Contrary to the EFSF
guidelines, the ESM guidelines do not specify the typical size of the credit line56.
For each intervention, the ESM will in principle limit its purchase to a maximum
of 50% of the issued amount. This means that the share bought at issuance by
the ESM will not be larger than the share bought by the market. As a rule, the
ESM will participate at the market price57. If the primary market purchase fails
to yield the necessary financing due to an insufficient private investor participa-
tion, the financing gap would be closed by a regular loan from the ESM. A failed
53.  Art 5.2 of ESM guidelines on SMSF, op. cit. footnote 51. 
54.  See section 3.1.C.
55.  ESM, (2012), ESM Guideline on the Primary Market Support Facility. 
56.  See op. cit. footnote 48. The EFSF specify no up-front cap, but nonetheless indicate that the ‘typical
size’ of the credit line is expected to ‘vary between 2 and 10% of GDP of the Member State concerned’.
This indication was dropped in the corresponding ESM guidelines. 
57.  At the weighted average price in an auction and at the re-offer price in a syndicated transaction, see
ESM, Guideline on the Primary Market Support Facility, Art. 4. op. cit. footnote 55.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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auction would however quickly raise concerns and the precautionary pro-
gramme would necessarily have to be reassessed.
Ideally, the size of the credit line should be large enough to guarantee that the
ESM support at issuance will last for a couple of years. For example, in 2013,
the gross refinancing requirements should approximate EUR 232bn for Spain
and EUR 380bn for Italy58. This represents more than 20% of GDP in both
countries. In a scenario where the ESM would buy half of the issued amounts in
that year, an initial envelope of about 15% of GDP would be necessary (around
EUR 200bn for Italy and EUR 100bn for Spain). Of course, ideally the fund
might not need to cover half of the total issued amount. The necessary size also
much depends on the tactics used by the ESM, in particular on which maturity
of issuances it will focus its purchases. However, the credit line size should ide-
ally be either large or sufficiently flexible to build trust among investors.
For secondary market interventions, while the EFSF guidelines stated that the
envelope for a secondary market intervention would be equal to the remaining
lending capacity of the EFSF59, no such precisions are included in the ESM
guidelines. Pro-tempore intervention caps would be set in line with a global
strategy decided by the ESM and the ECB.
E. Monitoring
For both a SMSF and a PFA, monitoring of the continued compliance with the
policy conditions specified in the MoU is ensured by the Commission in liaison
with the ECB. Stronger monitoring under the form of ‘enhanced surveillance’
applies as soon as an ECCL is granted or a PCCL is drawn via primary market
purchases or loans.
Under enhanced surveillance, the country is the object of closer scrutiny. First,
stronger cooperation is expected of the beneficiary country, with the Commis-
sion acting in liaison with the ECB, the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and where appropriate
the IMF. The beneficiary country must provide all relevant information regard-
ing its economic and financial situation upon request. Finally, the Commission
in liaison with ECB and where needed or appropriate with the IMF and ESAs
will conduct regular review missions in the Member states under surveillance to
verify the progress made in the implementation of the adopted measures.
Accordingly, the Commission will notably assess whether further policy meas-
ures are needed.
58.  Assuming the short-term debt maturing in 2012 is rolled-over in short term debt in 2013. According
to IMF, (2012), Fiscal Monitor, Balancing fiscal policy risks (April 2012), Table 2, p.3.
59.  See acceptance procedure in EFSF, (2011), EFSF Guideline on interventions in the secondary market.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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If the beneficiary country deviates from its policy conditions or if those commit-
ments have become clearly inadequate, or if – in the case of SMSF – it assessed
that the secondary market interventions have become inadequate to contain the
financial disturbance, the Board of Directors, acting on a proposal from the
Managing Director, can reconsider the adequacy of the SMSF or of the PFA60.
The Board of Governors may in turn ultimately decide to discontinue primary
or secondary market purchases.
60.  Moreover, under PFA, after the beneficiary country has drawn funds for the first time via a loan or a
primary market purchase, the Board of Directors will decide on a proposal from the Managing Director
and based on an assessment conducted by the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, whether
the credit line continues to be adequate or whether another form of financial assistance is needed. See Art
7 (3) of the ESM Guidelines on Precautionary Financial assistance, op. cit. footnote 52. 33
4. CONDITIONAL SECONDARY MARKET
INTERVENTIONS OF THE ECB
The ECB is at the centre of all expectations to mitigate/solve the crisis of the
eurozone. Its stance is the object of much debate; some claiming it does too little,
others too much. The two essential mandates of the ECB – a positive one, that
of ensuring price stability; and a negative one, that of not engaging into mone-
tization of public debt –, lie at the core of the discussions.
In practice, the ECB acts as an effective financial backstop for the financial sec-
tor and limits liquidity issues via a variety of instruments which include, in par-
ticular, the Eurosystem’s TARGET 2 settlement system, Long Term Refinancing
Operations and Emergency Liquidity Assistance61. Arguably, these instruments
have indirectly reduced sovereign bonds’ yields by maintaining the financial sec-
tor afloat.
Moreover, the ECB adopted unconventional policy instruments to directly
address tensions in the eurozone sovereign bond markets, by intervening on sec-
ondary markets. I will first describe the features of Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT) (4.1), and then highlight the limits to the ECB power in this con-
text (4.2). A global view on the strategy for preemptive intervention that OMT
allows in practice will be discussed in the fifth part of the paper.
4.1. Outright Monetary Transactions
On 6 September 2012, the ECB officially announced its new programme of mar-
ket purchases in secondary markets, dubbed ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’
(OMT). OMT in practice replace and terminate the Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP) which was established in May 2010 to ensure a proper ‘mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism and thereby the effective conduct of mone-
tary policy oriented towards price stability in the medium term’62. The pro-
gramme notably allowed for secondary market purchases of European
government bonds with the aim of propping up sovereign bond yields of coun-
tries under financial pressure. Within the SMP, the ECB purchased in early 2010
and mid 2011 sovereign bonds of several distressed countries63.
61.  For an overview, see Bijlsma, M., Vallée, S., (2012), “The creation of euro area financial safety nets”,
Bruegel working paper, 2012/09, july 2012. 
62.  ECB, Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010, establishing a securities market pro-
gramme, ECB/2010/5.
63.  The ECB has not provided a detailed break-down of purchased securities. It is assumed that Italy’s
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The OMT programme characteristics are the following64:
– Conditionality: The beneficiary country must first request an EFSF/ ESM
precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided
that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases.
Countries under an EFSF/ESM macro-economic programme are eligible.
– Coverage: No ex-ante quantitative limits exist on bond purchases i.e. inter-
vention is potentially unlimited. OMT will concentrate on buying sover-
eign bonds with a maturity of one to three years.
– Decision: The decision on starting and ending OMT for a country is taken
by the ECB governing council. The ECB will stop OMT in case of non-
compliance with a macro-economic adjustment programme or a precau-
tionary programme or because the objective is reached.
– No seniority: The Eurosystem has “pari passu” creditor status (unlike in
the SMP programme).
– The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be
fully sterilized i.e. its effect on monetary policy will be controlled for.
– The ECB will disclose the aggregated weekly value of its purchases. The
average duration of OMT holdings and the breakdown by country will be
made public on a monthly basis.
The rationale of the ECB Governing Council went a step further compared to
the SMP rationale. Not only would the ECB ‘safeguard the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro Area’, it would also address
‘severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in partic-
ular, unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro’65.
The ECB seems to partially endorse a lender of last resort role, by stressing
unlimited purchase is in principle available. The explicit immediate intended
effect is the suppression of ‘convertibility’ or ‘redomination’ risk premiums
requested by investors when trading sovereign bonds. These risks are
‘unfounded’ since ‘the euro is irreversible’, as the ECB claims66. The ECB also
justifies OMT because of possible self-fulfilling expectations pushing countries
into a bad equilibrium67.
64.  ECB, technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, press release, 6 September 2012, availa-
ble on the ECB website: www.ecb.int.
65.  ECB, Press conference, 6 September 2012, transcript available at: http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/
2012/html/is120906.en.html.
66.  Ibidem.
67.  See section 2.3 on the economic rationale of the intervention.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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The major fundamental feature of OMT is that it makes the ECB’s intervention
conditional to a request for precautionary programme implying the possibility
of primary market purchases. This conditionality, a fundamental distinction
with previous purchases under the SMP, essentially allows the ECB to counter
two types of critics. The first is that secondary market purchases, by lowering
market discipline, are an invitation for wrong fiscal behavior (i.e. creates moral
hazard). The second is that secondary market purchases amount to government
debt monetizing (or entail ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy). This
approach limits the political dimension of the activation of OMT and covers the
ECB in so far that it relies on a unanimous political decision of the Eurogroup
to grant precautionary financing – under conditions – to a eurozone member
requesting it.
The ECB announced no specific target interest rate but stated it would consider
yield ceilings, spreads, conditions of liquidity and volatility for its interven-
tions68. Risks for the balance sheet of the ECB will be further limited because
OMT will focus on bonds with a short maturity left. Finally, unlike in its SMP,
the ECB will not have a preferred creditor status i.e. it will rank pari-passu with
other bond holders. This disposition suppresses concerns that, with a senior
status, the ECB purchases would have been detrimental to the value of bonds
held by the private sector.
4.2. Limits of secondary market purchases by the ECB
In a context where the EU seems to lack the capacity to take executive decisions
to manage the eurozone crisis69, the ECB has in practice dictated a strategy for
preventive financing of eurozone countries at risk of losing market access.
Nonetheless, it should not justify complacency by EU political leaders. This
strategy specifically calls for prompt political follow-up for two reasons70.
Firstly, the ECB cannot guarantee that a default will not occur because it does
not act as a genuine lender of last resort. While conditionality is central to the
ECB approach, there is no such thing as a ‘conditional’ lender of last resort. By
stressing it only intends to remove unfounded fears of a euro break-up and rec-
ognizing that solvency issues must be tackled otherwise, the ECB explicitly
excludes the idea of supporting an insolvent country. By imposing conditions
that ensure the country is mostly solvent, the ECB further excludes this possibil-
ity. Following this logic, the ECB will not, in principle, prevent an insolvent
68.  Op. cit. footnote 65.
69.  Veron, N., (2012), “The challenges of Europe’s fourfold union”, Bruegel policy contribution, issue
2012/13, August 2012.
70.  This global strategy will be discussed in more details in the section 5.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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country from losing market access. Thus a country might end up requesting a
full bail-out of the ESM. Ultimately, a default or an exit from the eurozone is
still a conceivable event. The market will take notice of this point and a country
might still be pushed to default because of self-fulfilling fears of default (or be
pushed into a ‘bad equilibrium’). Thus, despite the fact that the ECB has under-
lined its action would be unlimited, the deterrent effect of OMT will not be
total. Without the right political action, the initial positive market reaction that
followed the announcement would likely wane over time71.
Second, even in case it starts intervening in the secondary market, the effective-
ness of OMT will much depend on the reforms implemented at the beneficiary
country level, and on the extent to which the economic pillar of the EMU is
reinforced at the EU level. The fate of the euro as a common currency depends
on a confidence factor. The ECB can only contribute to restore trust. Market
forces would ultimately decide whether to keep investing in a fragile country,
whose currency is the euro, is safe enough. In principle, the ECB will stop inter-
vening as soon as a country benefitting from OMT will lose market access. Polit-
ical action is therefore needed, a fact constantly stressed by the ECB Governing
Council members. In other words, the ECB can only buy time for political action
as it cannot ensure that the euro is irreversible on its own.
71.  This is in line with the conclusion on the economic rationale of a preventive intervention (see section
2.3.D).37
5. PREVENTIVE STRATEGY: COMBINED
INTERVENTIONS BY THE ESM AND THE ECB
With its OMT program, the ECB actually designed a ‘preventive strategy’ con-
sisting in combined interventions of the ESM on the primary market and of the
ECB on the secondary market of countries under financial pressure. This chap-
ter will summarize and further discuss the implications of a combined interven-
tion of the ESM and of the ECB action (5.1). Remaining issues, in particular
related to the stigma attached to their activation, will then be discussed in more
details (5.2).
5.1. Design overview
In principle, OMT would be subordinated to the granting of an EECL involving
primary market purchases. Consequently, the complete set of conditions
attached to the EECL will apply to the ECB’s OMT. Table 1 (p. 37) compares
the characteristics of a possible combined intervention from the ESM on the
primary market and the ECB on the secondary market.
Table 1: ESM and ECB respective interventions’ characteristics
European Stability Mechanism European Central Bank
Financial assistance 
Instrument
Enhanced Conditions Credit line 
(ECCL) with primary market pur-
chases
Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT)
Action Primary market bond purchases Secondary market bond purchases
Creditor status  In principle no preferred creditor sta-
tus (not an ‘ESM loan’)
Pari-passu with other creditors (no 
seniority)
Size of intervention No upfront cap
Max 50% of each issuance
Unlimited
Price Approximation of market price:
– Auction: at the weighted average 
price of the auction
– Syndicated transactions: at the re-
offer price
At market price
Maturity No indication Short maturities (1-3 years)
Duration In principle: maximum two years 
(duration of credit line)
1 year renewable twice for six months
Upon continued respect of condi-
tions
As long as ESM credit line remains 
available
Precondition Signing of TSCG
Request by beneficiary Euro Area 
Member State
Signing of MoU and FFA
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The activation of the combined bond buying is first preconditioned upon
request of the beneficiary. The requesting country must sign a MoU and FFA
detailing the conditions to be respected to benefit from a continued support. If
eligibility criteria are not met, in particular if the requesting country cannot
demonstrate a ‘sustainable external position’ and a ‘sustainable public debt’,
these will have to be compensated for by other measures. This is where a polit-
ical bargain can be expected about the mix of structural reforms and deficit
reductions measures that will be conditional for the granting of the precaution-
ary credit line. In principle, active involvement of the IMF will be sought in the
process. The ECB has stressed this would be its preferred scenario although it
does not exclude proceeding with OMT even without the IMF involvement. The
beneficiary country will then have to demonstrate continuous compliance with
the conditions, in particular with the corrective measures required to address the
criteria not met. In principle, combined interventions should be made possible
over a period of one year, twice renewable for six months.
In principle, several events should trigger an exit from the combined bond pur-
chasing. If the countries continuously fail to implement the measures it agreed
upon in the MoU, the Eurogroup could ultimately sanction the country by inter-
rupting the programme. The continuation of bond buying not only rests on a
political decision regarding continued compliance but also on market forces.
Indeed, if the combined purchases fail to maintain the country’s access to the
financial market, they would miss their objective and would consequently need
to be interrupted. Therefore, both programmes intend to take market price sig-
Conditions criteria Continued compliance with terms of 
MoU and FFA.
Respect of the following criteria or 
corrective measures aimed at 
addressing criteria not met:
1. Respect of SGP commitments (or 
formal commitment to address the 
imbalances indentified)
2. Sustainable public debt
3. Respect of EIP commitments (or 
formal commitment to address the 
imbalances indentified)
4. Track record of access to financial 
market on reasonable terms
5.Sustainable external position
6. Absence of bank solvency prob-
lems that can pose systemic threats 
to the euro
De facto same as ESM
Table 1: ESM and ECB respective interventions’ characteristics (Continued)
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nals into account. An exit from the programme would be triggered in particular
by repeated auction failures, necessitating primary market purchases above
50% of the issued amount. Since this would signal the country is reaching insol-
vency despite the interventions, the ECB would also stop intervening. Finally, in
principle if the credit line is depleted, it would either have to be extended or
primary market interventions by the ESM would stop. In this case, whether the
ECB would continue its intervention on the secondary market is uncertain.
While the ECB will focus its intervention on relatively short-term maturities, the
ESM has no predefined strategy. Focusing on short term maturities protects the
buyer from a potential default, and arguably prevents moral hazard issues, but
at the same time it might tend to signal a lack of confidence on the sustainability
of the country’s debt, and lead to a crowding out of investors on longer maturi-
ties.
5.2. Mitigating the risk of non activation of the 
preventive strategy
An overview of the risk of the strategy not actually being activated is given (A)
followed by some recommendations to overcome this issue (B).
A. Overview
What would determine the success of the strategy in the first place is whether the
ailing country requests support in time to justify a precautionary programme.
The alternative could ultimately be a full ex-post bail-out with the accompanying
macro-economic adjustment programme. In the latter case, the ECB would not
act as the country would be deemed mostly insolvent. Once a country has lost
access to financial markets and is under a macro-economic adjustment pro-
gramme, the ECB will only act in order to help the country regain access to finan-
cial markets i.e. when the country is exiting its adjustment programme.
Trying to avoid requesting preventive support for too long is risky. From a mar-
ket perspective, given the uncertainty of the activation of primary market pur-
chases and the attached OMT, the market might start anticipating a full bail-out
rather than a preventive financial assistance. Once it has lost market access, it
will be too late for a country to benefit from the ‘big bazooka’, the combined
ESM/ECB intervention was intended to be72.
72.  In the course of the global financial and economic crisis, the ‘big bazooka’ became a popular expres-
sion referring to the deterrence effect of a large intervention. After an original quote by Hank Paulson,
former US Treasury secretary, before the US Congress, on 15 July 2008: ‘If you have a bazooka in your
pocket and people know it, you probably won’t have to use it’.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
40
As underlined previously, relying on the announcement effect could only prove
itself to be a mistake. The more the country delays the request, the more likely
it is that market pressure will intensify. And the closer the country will be to a
potential default, the more difficult it will be to obtain relatively low conditions
from its eurozone partners. Moreover, by then, the eventual request for support
will signal a solvency problem rather than a liquidity problem. In sum, as time
passes, political and economic stigma might actually rise to the point where
preemptive financial assistance is never activated. Complacency and indecisive-
ness could jeopardize the preventive strategy suggested by the ECB.
B. Recommendations
While distressed countries should not unnecessarily delay requesting support,
other partner countries need to be sufficiently accommodating. It is in the inter-
est of all eurozone countries to facilitate assistance requests and the resulting
opening of precautionary credit lines from the ESM. This would truly load ‘the
big bazooka’ that so far only exists on paper. Therefore the main issue revolves
around what ‘appropriate’ conditions should be attached to the precautionary
programme. In principle, these should be light enough to encourage the country
to request assistance and strong enough to prevent moral hazard risks73.
Events repeatedly highlighted the issue surrounding the conditionality attached
to precautionary assistance. At the European Council on 28-29 June 2012, the
request by Italy that the EFSF/ESM should be ready to support the Italian debt
with lower conditionalities than under a macro-economic adjustment pro-
gramme was followed by an agreement subject to much ambiguity, both in its
content and its possible implementation. Then, following the OMT announce-
ment by the ECB, Spain, most in need of assistance, has appeared to attribute
much stigma to the use of the ex-ante EFSF/ESM facilities.
Several recommendations can be formulated. First, moral hazard concerns
should not dominate discussions. The objective of precautionary assistance is
precisely to – temporarily – facilitate continued access to the financial market.
The market will therefore still discipline the country under a precautionary pro-
gramme. This discipline will be effective as the market would fear the country
would slip from its adjustment path, stop respecting elementary conditions and
ultimately risk losing the benefits of both primary and secondary market inter-
ventions.
Secondly, prior clarification and agreement regarding the conditionalities of
support would be a strong signal that political brinkmanship will not dictate
73.  See section 2.4 for the general discussion on this dilemma and the economic rationale of preventive
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crisis management. The Commission, in liaison with the ECB, should inform
eurozone countries in advance of the eligibility criteria to facilitate requests.
Thirdly, while at the time of writing the focus is on Spain, other countries with
relatively sound economic situations, but which are still under the threat of a
sudden deterioration of their sovereign bond market, should also ideally request
the opening of stand-by credit line. They should do so even if they do not plan
to activate the assistance under the current relatively favorable circumstances.
This would prevent future difficulties in case support is one day needed and
would have a strong deterrent effect. Italy should in particular consider doing
so74.
Fourthly, there is a possibility that the question of the seniority of ESM will
arise. I argued that, in principle, there is no de jure status attached to the bond
the ESM will hold on its books. However, investors might still anticipate that a
de facto seniority applies. That ambiguity should be lifted as the ECB did for its
OMT programme.
Finally, beyond the most crucial question of setting the right conditions, the size
of the credit line granted under the precautionary programme should not be
overlooked. The credit line should ideally be larger than 10% of GDP, or allow
for some flexibility, to ensure the coverage of two years of refinancing needs75.
74.  Cline, W.R., (2012), “Interest rate shock and sustainability of Italy’s sovereign debt”, policy brief,
PB12-5, Peterson Institute of International Economics.
75.  See section 3.2.D for a complete discussion.43
6. EUROBONDS AS ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO
PREVENT THE RISE OF BORROWING COSTS?
I will first briefly describe what Eurobonds are (6.1). As I will argue, their char-
acteristics lead to economic and political issues rendering the introduction of
Eurobonds unrealistic in the short term (6.2). I will then summarize why, when
strictly considered as a short-term crisis management tool, Eurobonds present
downsides compared to mechanisms readily available i.e. EFSF/ESM and ECB
(6.3).
6.1. A definition of Eurobonds
Many proposals for the introduction of Eurobonds gained much attention in the
course of the eurozone crisis76. Eurobonds schemes can vary greatly but none-
theless share some common principles. Eurobonds are commonly issued bonds
whose proceeds can partially serve to cover eurozone countries’ financing needs.
In practice, Eurobonds are issued by an entity (e.g. a ‘debt agency’) backed by
guarantees of eurozone countries. Since the outbreak of the eurozone crisis,
Eurobonds schemes were mostly being discussed as a short-term crisis manage-
ment tool that would especially benefit countries under market pressure.
The case for a short term introduction of Eurobonds basically follows the same
logic than pre-emptive interventions discussed in this paper. This should not
come as a surprise as the bonds issued by the ESM are basically ‘Eurobonds’
themselves: these are also commonly issued and backed by the guarantees of
eurozone countries. In terms of conditionality, Eurobonds present a similar
tradeoff between stigma and moral hazard issues that arise under a precaution-
ary programme of the EFSF/ESM77. There are two major differences between
the two mechanisms though. Firstly, while the ESM provides financing to a lim-
ited selection of countries, the entity issuing Eurobonds generally provides fund-
ing to all eurozone members systematically. Secondly, and as a consequence, the
guarantee structure underlying the scheme should in principle be stronger to
allow for a much larger lending capacity.
76.  Most notably: the Blue bond proposal (Delpla, J.,von Weizsäcker, J., (2010), “The Blue Bond pro-
posal”, Bruegel policy brief, Issue 2010/03), the European Redemption fund proposal (German Council
of Economic Expert, (2011) “Euro area in crisis, Annual report 2011/12”, annual report of GCEE, chap-
ter 3), the Eurobills proposal (Hellwig, C., Philippon, T., (2011), “Eurobills, not Eurobonds”, available
at: http://www.voxeu.org/article/eurobills-not-euro-bonds). For a broad overview and comparisons see
Claessens, S.,Mody, A., Vallee, S., (2012), “Paths to Eurobonds”, Bruegel Working Paper, 2012/10.
77.  For an overview of conditionality considerations, see section 2.4. It should be noted that for the same
conditionality level, financing via Eurobonds would probably present a lower stigma than under a precau-
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6.2. Economic and political issues
A. Redistribution effects
In so far that financing via the common issuance is mandatory, i.e. all guarantors
in the scheme are at the same time beneficiaries78, Eurobonds would have a direct
redistribution effect. Less creditworthy countries would likely benefit from the
lower interest rates on the common issuance while fiscally strong countries would
likely pay a higher borrowing cost than previously. Seen from this static perspec-
tive, the scheme would only create winners and losers: ‘high-yield’ countries would
benefit at the detriment of ‘low-yield’ countries as illustrated in BOX 2 (p. 45).
Whether this relative loss for fiscally strong countries can potentially be offset
mostly depends on the absolute gains that could be achieved (in BOX 2: the
extent to which the actual common interest rate would be below the weighted
average interest rate  ). As liquidity gains would most probably be limited79,
this would only be possible if current interest rate levels were much above nor-
mal levels. If this is due to fears of a break-up, Eurobonds introduction would
arguably contribute to breaking these expectations, and lower interest rates80.
However, it is clear that in so far that this dynamic is detrimental in some fiscally
vulnerable countries; it benefits fiscally strong countries, as capital flight from
fiscally weak to fiscally strong countries tends to lower their interest rates. While
some absolute gains are likely, one should thus not expect that the common
borrowing cost of the eurozone would decrease below that of fiscally strong
countries when Eurobonds are introduced.
Nonetheless, absolute gains could be distributed unevenly among eurozone
countries by allowing a differentiated interest rates allowed by a bonus/penalty
system81. However, whether countries currently benefiting from low yields
would benefit still depends on the expected absolute gains which are inherently
uncertain. Moreover, in a dynamic perspective, it is arguable that the compen-
sation might only add to the distressed countries’ indebtedness and thus ulti-
mately have no value to the healthy ones accepting a future liability in
exchange82. This uncertainty and the complexity of the scheme might make the
proposal excessively difficult to negotiate.
78.  (in figure 2 p. 22), where the ‘debt agency’ substitutes for the ESM as the issuing entity, guarantors
and beneficiaries circles coincides.
79.  See European Commission, (2011), “Green Paper on the Feasibility of Introducing Stability Bonds”,
COM (2011)/818, 23 November 2011.
80.  In a similar way as ‘ex-ante’ or ‘preventive’ financing, in particular primary market interventions dis-
cussed supra.
81.  For a proposition involving differentiated interest rates, see for example Artus, P., Cuillère, T., El
Moutawakil, B., (2011), “What bonus/penalty system for the eurobond?”, Natixis, Flash economics,
N°613, 22 August 2011.
82.  Tirole, J., (2012), “The euro crisis: some reflexions on institutional reforms”, Banque de France
Financial Stability Review, N°16, April 2012.
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The EFSF/ESM’ loans or primary market interventions are not implying a direct
impact on the interest rates of the strongest guarantors. Their beneficiaries are
specific countries that requested support rather than all of the eurozone coun-
tries that might be ‘forced’ to partially finance themselves via Eurobonds.
BOX 2: Eurobonds redistribution effects (under full substitution of national
issuance)
The effect on interest rate is illustrated in the following figure where two
countries A and B pool their entire debt which we assume are of equal size
( ). Initially, country A has a borrowing cost of   (blue area)
and country B of   (red area). If A and B simply pool their debt together,
they now both pay the interest rate   which is lower than   but higher
than   (assuming it is the weighted average of the two). Hence, in a simple
pooling scheme A wins while B loses: A’s interest rate is lowered and B’s
interest rate is now higher. The overall borrowing cost for A and B taken
together is the grey area ( ). 
Although this scenario assumes the full substitution of national issuances by
Eurobonds, partial substitution would face similar redistribution issues.
DA DB = rBDA
rBDB
r* rA
rB
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B. Joint and several guarantees issue
Eurobonds proposals differ significantly from the EFSF/ESM scheme since all
guarantors of the scheme are at the same time beneficiaries (see figure 2, p. 22).
This necessitates a larger funding capacity and consequently a stronger guaran-
tee structure than that of the ESM. Accordingly, most ‘Eurobonds’ proposals
consider ‘joint & several guarantees’ as an absolute necessity to ensure the
robustness of the scheme. In principle, the guarantors would be liable not only
for their own share, but also for the others’ share in case the latter default. In
practice, if a beneficiary country defaults on its obligation to redeem its debt,
other countries would be requested to compensate for the loss incurred by the
issuing entity (e.g. the ‘debt agency’). In other words, eurozone countries would
collectively commit to insure each others’ debt.
Joint-and-several liability emerges more naturally in an environment in which
countries are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ i.e. commitments are not made in a
context where suspicion of cross-subsidies looms large83. Once lifted, it becomes
difficult to find a consensus on proposals likely implying significant risk-sharing
between creditworthy and less creditworthy countries. Moreover, the success of
Eurobonds would depend on how the market will react and on the beneficiary
countries’ ability and willingness to stabilize and reduce their debt level. Both
are inherently uncertain, which increases the difficulty in reaching an agreement.
In this difficult context, joint and several guarantees tend to be perceived as
dangerous and incredible because of the sizable commitment they imply. In
extremis, creditors could request that a small guarantor (like Estonia or Cyprus)
pay up for the debt of Spain or Italy84. Doubts about the capacity and willing-
ness of guarantors to pay such large amounts might induce the market to believe
joint and several guarantees are not really credible, thereby jeopardizing the
Eurobonds’ scheme.
In comparison to the ESM, eurozone countries would need to agree to expose
themselves to much larger contingent liabilities. In this sense, the difficulty of
introducing Eurobonds can be measured comparatively with the potential diffi-
culty of increasing liabilities under the ESM in order to boost its lending capac-
ity85. Political opposition is particularly vocal in countries perceived as fiscally
strong, most notably Germany, the Netherlands and Finland86.
83.  Ibidem.
84.  Gros, D., (2011), ”Eurobonds: wrong solution for legal, political and economic reasons”, 24 August
2011, available at: http://www.voxeu.org/article/Eurobonds-are-wrong-solution.
85.  While the ESM has EUR 700bn of committed guarantees, Euro-bills would require EUR 940bn, the
Redemption pact about 2.250bn, Blue Bonds about EUR 5.600 bn.
86.  In extremis, and strictly speaking, contingent liabilities for Germany (as percentage of GDP) would
amount to 36% for Eurobills, 117% for the Redemption Pact, 215% for Blue Bonds compared to 7.3%
for the ESM. Calculated as the German maximum liability under the scheme divided by Germany’s GDP
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6.3. Why Eurobonds are not a viable short term 
response
Eurobonds and the EFSF/ESM’s precautionary financing schemes share the same
core functioning principles. As such, Eurobonds do have the potential to lower
the borrowing cost of countries currently under strong market pressure. How-
ever, they would almost certainly imply higher interest rates for countries per-
ceived as fiscally strong. Moreover, by design, Eurobonds almost necessarily
assume joint and several guarantees. This implies that eurozone countries accept
a significant and almost unlimited exposure in the event that a beneficiary coun-
try defaults. This makes their introduction, in the current crisis context where
liabilities are precisely accounted for, extremely unlikely.
ESM precautionary programmes do not present these problems. Financing is
targeted at specific countries most in need. This requires a lower funding capac-
ity and lighter guarantee structure than with Eurobonds. Politically problematic
contingent liabilities are hence kept to a minimum. The ESM in particular is a
readily available vehicle, with a credible capital structure implying limited lia-
bilities, and which is better designed to provide liquidity assistance. If its size
proved to be too limited, eurozone countries would still have the possibility of
increasing its capacity, which would in any case be more politically palatable
than a short-term Eurobonds introduction.
Of course, Eurobonds design could actually resemble the ESM design to limit
these core issues. The scheme could be based on ‘several’ guarantees (instead of
‘joint and several’) and make financing with Eurobonds facultative. If so, one
could therefore question the need to have a second instrument very similar to
the ESM. The only difference might be that it would be strictly dedicated to ex-
ante financing. There is no obvious advantage to creating a separate entity. It
would be simpler to increase the ESM ceiling if needed.
This conclusion does not however preclude of the major benefits that forms of
Eurobonds could deliver within a reinforced EMU architecture. They could
evolve towards a common safe asset rivaling US Treasury Bonds and reinforce
the international role of the euro as a reserve currency. They could structurally
prevent the emergence of disruptive financial flows within the eurozone. They
could also insure the financing of a significant proportion of new solidarity
mechanisms which would act as buffers against cyclical regional shocks in the
EMU, notably facilitating the correction of external position imbalances.
However, even a limited Eurobonds scheme necessarily implies as a prerequisite
a political commitment towards a fiscal union, one crucial missing building
block in the EMU. This commitment, which would ultimately have to take the
form of a new Treaty, is unavoidable as the mutualisation of risks/debts calls forPREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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the mutualisation of control87. Whether EU countries manage to agree to the
transfers of sovereignty that such a major integration leap requires remains far
from certain, and will in any case and inevitably require some time.
87.  This paper hence does not discuss potential legal implications. For a brief overview, see Vanden
Bosch, X., Verhelst, S., (2012), “A briefing on Eurobonds”, Egmont Institute, European Policy Brief,
N°10, June 2012.49
CONCLUSION
There are several compelling benefits arising from an intervention in sovereign
bond markets to prevent a country’s borrowing cost to reach unsustainable lev-
els. In general, well designed pre-emptive purchases in a country’s primary and
secondary sovereign debt markets would be more efficient and less costly than
allowing this country to be bailed-out. In a scenario where large countries such
as Spain and Italy must simultaneously be rescued, full-scale bailout pro-
grammes that were used for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, would either require
more funding or involve a large debt restructuring. Since it is unlikely that more
funds will be committed in the ESM and that a default is precisely what should
be avoided, effective ex-ante financial assistance becomes a necessity to ensure
an efficient management of the eurozone crisis.
The original design of the EFSF/ESM was therefore reviewed to allow the funds
to act preemptively by intervening in primary or secondary sovereign bond mar-
kets for countries requesting support under a precautionary programme. In this
context of raising uncertainties regarding the future of the euro, the ECB sug-
gested a comprehensive and bold strategy preventing countries from losing
access to markets. For a country requesting preventive support, the ECB would
purchase the beneficiary countries’ bonds on an unlimited basis in secondary
markets (via OMT) while the ESM would impose the conditions and intervene
in primary markets. Given their respective firepower, this combination is with-
out doubt the most efficient path and allows for a political backing of the ECB
interventions.
Although some countries, notably Spain and Italy, have experienced threatening
pressure by financial markets, they so far refrained from requesting such sup-
port, notably because of the uncertainty regarding the attached conditions
which might prove stigmatizing. The eurozone should not however rely on the
market relief the ECB announcement has created because it can only wane over
time. Since the ECB made its intervention conditional, it does not fully endorse
the role of a lender of last resort and cannot guarantee on its own the irreversi-
bility of the euro. To be potentially activated the combined interventions by the
ECB and the ESM most importantly require the signing of a memorandum of
understanding setting the conditionality attached to them.
Taking notice of this, countries that regularly experience strong market pressure
should request the opening of a credit line while their situation on financial
markets still allows for it. Hesitation to do so only risks bringing them on the
edge of a financial precipice, as markets will start questioning whether the acti-
vation of the preventive strategy, including OMT, will ever take place. Once in
this situation, it will be even more complicated for the Eurogroup and the coun-PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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try on the verge of default, to agree on the conditions of a precautionary pro-
gramme, if not on the justification for a precautionary programme instead of a
regular bail-out. In this case, the benefits of secondary market purchases by the
ECB will be sorely missed as it would be too late to give a chance to the ECB to
intervene in secondary markets.
Other eurozone countries should facilitate the negotiations, by not requesting
unnecessarily strong conditions. The strategy is indeed ‘preventive’ as it aims to
encourage the market to keep financing the beneficiary country. In any case, it
is by design a temporary intervention. Market pressure will not be switched off
because the combined intervention is switched on. Consequently, excessive
moral hazard considerations should not jeopardize the whole strategy. Once an
agreement on the conditions is reached, the credit line should be large enough
to cover two years of primary market interventions. In sum, the success of pre-
ventive crisis management suggested by the ECB crucially depends on political
action: the ‘big bazooka’ is now available – on paper – but it will only be loaded
by granting ESM precautionary credit lines to countries necessitating it.
However, once properly activated, the preventive strategy can only buy some
time. Investors’ confidence in the irreversibility of the euro and in the solvability
of all its members cannot be restored by preventive crisis management mecha-
nisms, no matter the effectiveness of their design. This is a fundamental part of
the underlying rationale of the ECB’s strategy, as it assumes that while markets
can be prone to self-fulfilling expectation of insolvency, interest rates in sover-
eign bond markets convey important price signals. In this sense, the ECB’s claim
that ‘fears of the reversibility of the euro are unfounded’ is necessarily political:
investors’ fears might well be founded in so far as the fate of the euro rests on
political decisions upon which the ECB has no control.
To make sense and effectively buy time, preventive interventions must, hence,
necessarily be accompanied by political action. At the country level, time should
be used to pursue adjustment efforts. At the EU level, time must allow European
leaders to decide how the monetary union should be completed with political,
economic, fiscal and banking unions. As part of this comprehensive future
design, by reinforcing the economic side of the EMU, properly designed
Eurobonds could structurally limit financial markets’ volatility that currently
threaten the common currency. However, as several countries have repeatedly
stressed, even partial Eurobonds cannot be introduced before eurozone mem-
bers jointly agree on the future design of the EMU. Without such a commitment,
it would be elusive to believe an agreement on the introduction of Eurobonds
can be reached in the short term. In the meantime, a combined intervention by
the ESM and ECB is the most effective mechanism to mitigate the eurozone
crisis.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF EFSF/ESM 
PRECAUTIONARY ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS
Intervention type
Primary market purchases 
(or loan) under a Precau-
tionary Conditioned Credit 
Line (PCCL)
Primary market purchases 
(or loan) under an 
Enhanced Conditions 
credit line (ECCL)
Secondary market inter-
ventions
CONDITIONS
Preconditions Ratification of TSGC 
(ESM).
Request by beneficiary 
country.
Signing of MoU and FFA.
Ratification of TSGC 
(ESM).
Request by beneficiary 
country.
Signing of MoU and FFA.
Ratification of TSGC 
(ESM).
Request by beneficiary 
country.
Signing of MoU and FFA.
ECB assess the need for 
intervention.
(Analysis determining the 
potential existence of 
exceptional financial cir-
cumstances and risks to 
financial stability).
Ex-ante conditions (eligi-
bility criteria)
1. Respect of SGP commit-
ments (or formal commit-
ment to address the imbal-
ances indentified).
2. Sustainable public debt.
3. Respect of EIP commit-
ments (or formal commit-
ment to address the imbal-
ances indentified).
4. Track record of access to 
financial market on reason-
able terms.
5. Sustainable external 
position.
6. Absence of bank sol-
vency problems that can 
pose systemic threats to the 
euro. 
Same criteria as under a 
PPCL but for those not met 
–> ex-post conditions
1. Respect of SGP commit-
ments (or formal commit-
ment to address the imbal-
ances indentified).
2. Sustainable public debt.
3. Respect of EIP commit-
ments (or formal commit-
ment to address the imbal-
ances indentified).
4. Track record of access to 
financial market on reason-
able terms.
5. Sustainable external 
position.
6. Absence of bank sol-
vency problems that can 
pose systemic threats to the 
euro.
Monitoring of ex-ante con-
ditions
Continuous respect of the 
eligibility criteria monitored 
by the Commission.
Continuous respect of the 
eligibility criteria (that were 
met when the credit line 
was granted) monitored by 
the Commission.
Continuous respect of the 
eligibility criteria monitored 
by the Commission.
Ex-post conditions The beneficiary country 
must adopt corrective 
measures aimed at address-
ing remaining vulnerabili-
ties (criteria not met).
Enhanced surveillance Commission in liaison with 
ECB from the moment the 
credit line is drawn (acti-
vated).
Commission in liaison with 
ECB from the moment the 
credit line is granted.
Commission in liaison with 
ECB. Deviation can lead to 
revision condition in MoU 
or termination of pro-
gramme.
Activation At the initiative of the bene-
ficiary country.
At the initiative of the bene-
ficiary country.
At the initiative of the Euro 
Working Group/Board of 
Directors Technical Sub-
committee including the 
ECB, on the basis of the 
ECB analysis.PREVENTING THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN BORROWING COSTS IN THE EUROZONE
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INTERVENTION SIZE
Total reserve No upfront cap.
Typical size to be expected 
2-10% of GDP (EFSF).
No upfront cap.
Typical size to be expected 
2-10% of GDP (EFSF).
EFSF: all remaining capac-
ity
ESM: not specified.
Intervention Limit (per 
issuance/ over time)
Primary market purchases: 
in principle max 50% of 
final issue amount.
Loan: maximum tranche 
size set in FFA (of credit 
line).
Primary market purchases: 
in principle max 50% of 
final issue amount.
Loan: maximum tranche 
size set in FFA (of credit 
line).
EFSF/ESM and ECB sets 
pro-tempore intervention 
caps. Reports only on 
weekly volume.
Price Primary market purchases: 
(Auction) at the weighted 
average price of the auction 
or (Syndicated transac-
tions) at the re-offer price.
Loan: same conditions as 
for regular loans.
Primary market purchases: 
(Auction) at the weighted 
average price of the auction 
or (Syndicated transac-
tions) at the re-offer price.
Loan: same conditions as 
for regular loans.
At market price.